Suchergebnisse

AbstractAs a form of legal separation taking place within a quasi‐federal framework, Brexit displayed important conceptual similarities with secession, in that it was predicated upon notions of collective identity and aspirations of renewed self‐government. This article examines the interrelationship between Brexit, secession as a legal concept, and secessionism as a political phenomenon. It advances two main arguments: at a first stage, it highlights that while Brexit ideologically aligns with secessionism, it could not have met any sustained international law definition of secession itself. However, the constitutional constraint to the European Union's formal status as an association of states (Staatenverbund) as opposed to a federation (Staatsverband) has rendered its withdrawal provision (Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)) unduly impervious to the important practical parallels between the Brexit process and decisional, that is, negotiated, forms of secession. The article goes on to argue that an active recognition of aspects of decisional secession within the EU constitutional framework could have allowed for a more complex and dialogical resolution of Brexit than the conditions set up by the unilateral withdrawal clause allowed.

AbstractThis article analyses the main debates over the application of the Charter to disputes between private parties and assesses the ways in which the case law over the last ten years has responded to them. The article goes on to propose an alternative schema, whereby horizontality can be understood as a structural principle of EU fundamental rights adjudication on its own terms, rather than as an extension of the direct effect doctrine. It is argued that a self-standing principle of horizontality with equally valuable—yet operationally distinct—direct, indirect, and state-mediated manifestations, could respond more coherently to the conceptual, procedural, and remedial challenges displayed in the case law.

This article considers the constitutional requirements and implications of Article 50 TEU for the EU. It argues that it is essential to read Article 50 in light of the features of the Treaty of which it forms part together with its drafting context, that of the Convention on the Future of Europe, as well as the substantive protections of EU constitutional law. The article demonstrates that important constitutional constraints are in place in EU law, which can affect the most significant debates in the withdrawal process, namely: the manner in which notification to withdraw from the Union is given; the revocability of a decision to withdraw; and the legal basis and content of the withdrawal agreement. Most importantly, a reading of Article 50 informed by key constitutional features of the EU legal order stipulates clear duties for the EU to respect the UK's constitutional requirements and to protect, in any eventual agreement, acquired rights for EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, by emphasizing the illegality of a non-compliant withdrawal agreement from the EU perspective.